0.7 bsidesvienna-0x7ea 2026-06-27 2026-06-27 1 00:05 https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/schedule/ Europe/Vienna 2026-06-27T09:30:00+02:00 09:30 00:45 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-666-mcp-most-concerning-protocol https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/K7JNE8/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en TLDR: If you as an attacker want more tools to gain RCE and persistence MCP is exactly that. AI agents are rapidly becoming a new interface to enterprise systems: they read internal knowledge, call APIs, and execute actions through connected tools. MCP standardizes this tool access, but it also creates a new, high-impact attack surface: tool execution integrity. Basically our talk shows all the ways attackers can leverage MCP for RCE and persistence. In this talk we demonstrate “MCP hijacking in the wild” through an attack demo that shows how a compromised or malicious MCP tool execution path can become an attacker control channel. Critically, we show why common hardening approaches are insufficient in practice by demonstrating bypass and/or time-of-check/time-of-use gaps during the demo itself. We close with a proof-of-concept integrity protection method designed to raise the bar against MCP toolchain compromise by enforcing trustworthy tool identity and invocation integrity, with practical guidance Paul Zenker 2026-06-27T10:20:00+02:00 10:20 00:45 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-630-hey-claude-find-0days-using-ai-for-vulnerability-research-red-teaming https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/LQVWHG/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en "Friends don't let friends upload their tradecraft to VirusTotal", but what about AI? More and more companies are integrating AI into their pipelines and workflows, and we can see headlines of AI finding hundreds of bugs everywhere online. So how can we integrate this technology into our work without burning our tradecraft - is this even possible? We'll examine the capabilities of AI itself, how we can integrate it into our research to find more bugs more quickly, and how well it can be used for weaponization. To visualize this, we'll walk through at least one real-world vulnerability: my original approach, how that approach can be improved by AI, and to what degree. But the advantages of AI come at a (hidden) cost: we're sharing everything with a third party, be it Anthropic, Google, or whoever. Would you upload your C2 beacon to VirusTotal during a Red Team? So, where exactly should we draw the line on AI? Niels Pfau 2026-06-27T11:10:00+02:00 11:10 01:00 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-625-bofs-in-the-background-async-object-file-execution-in-modern-c2-frameworks https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/C37PNQ/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Talk en Using Beacon Object Files (BOFs) to execute external post-exploitation capabilities from a C2 agent has been a staple technique in offensive security for years now. The self-contained programs are great for one-off tasks, such as gaining situational awareness, elevating privileges or dumping credentials. Recently, BOFs have received a powerful upgrade that allows for them to be executed in the background, enabling long-running real-time monitoring functionality. This talk shows how the [Conquest](https://github.com/jakobfriedl/conquest/) framework supports Async BOFs and how they can benefit modern red teaming. In [last year's](https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7e9-2025/talk/VCQATE/) talk, I introduced Conquest, a command and control framework written in Nim. Since then, the project has been under heavy development and has seen countless new features, fixes and improvements. One of the most substantial changes was the addition of a Python module system, which allows red teamers and penetration testers to turn their favourite BOFs into Conquest commands. This drastically decreases the amount of functionality that has to be included in the base agent, because post-exploitation capabilities can simply be executed as external BOFs. However, regular BOF loading is boring. There are countless open-source implementations and it's a feature in almost all C2 frameworks on the market. On the other hand, the number of frameworks that support asynchronous BOFs can almost be counted on one hand. In fact, Conquest is one of the only C2s that features stable async object file execution, even when the agent memory is obfuscated or encrypted, something that until now has been exclusive to commercial tooling. This talk goes beyond proof-of-concepts by also featuring novel use-cases for async BOFs that benefit real engagements. - [TGT Monitoring](https://github.com/jakobfriedl/tgt-monitor-bof) - [KeePass Abuse](https://github.com/jakobfriedl/keelog-bof) - [Clipboard Monitoring](https://github.com/jakobfriedl/clipboard-monitor-bof) - ... /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/C37PNQ/readme_g73zddj.png Jakob Friedl 2026-06-27T13:15:00+02:00 13:15 00:45 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-678-net-shredder-coverage-guided-network-fuzzing-for-the-linux-kernel https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/TVJ7J8/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en Net Shredder is a network coverage-guided fuzzer for the Linux kernel. Built with a modular approach, and focused on the ease of use, it could be adapted to fuzz other types of targets (e.g., usermode applications) as well. During development, it found three remote vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel, one of which resulted in CVE-2025-22037. Net Shredder was built out of desire to build the simplest fuzzing setup possible for the Linux kernel: - Unlike grammar based fuzzing, this approach doesn’t require rewriting the protocol spec in terms of fuzzer grammar; - Just a basic setup and a fuzzing corpus is enough; - Only small target modifications required. This talks covers building it as a solo project I did in 2025: - Collecting remote KCOV outside process context, turning raw PCs into edge coverage - The struggle of restricting coverage to the targeted subsystem (2 failed and the one that worked) - Three bugs it found, including CVE-2025-22037 with bug analysis. Vyacheslav "Slava" Moskvin 2026-06-27T14:05:00+02:00 14:05 00:45 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-631-project-tempa-getting-phon-e-key-with-tesla-security-again https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/W9MWHG/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en Four years ago, Project TEMPA exposed the fundamental vulnerabilities within Tesla’s Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Passive Entry system and the Vehicle Controller Secondary (VCSEC) protocol. The research demonstrated how trivial it was to execute Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) relay attacks to unlock and drive away modern vehicles. In response, Tesla embarked on a multi-year effort to overhaul its access systems. But did they actually fix the underlying problems, or just change the locks? ​In this presentation, we are getting "phonkey" again. We will dive into a comprehensive 4-year retrospective of Tesla’s Phonekey security evolution, dissecting the ongoing tug-of-war between seamless user experience and robust vehicle security. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/W9MWHG/TEMPA_v2-Titleslide_IouA11d.png Martin Herfurt 2026-06-27T15:20:00+02:00 15:20 00:45 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-681-back-to-the-binary-revisiting-similarities-of-android-apps https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/J9QR9K/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en New versions are usually exciting and full of possibilities, but keeping up with every new edge-case can be a very exhausting task. Especially on Android tools go out of date quickly and the latest research paper's implementation probably relies on a Java version most developers roll their eyes at. But binaries? Binary tooling is forever. Well, let's say slightly more stable. We'll explore on a practical example how to use the Android Runtime to compile apps' Dalvik bytecode into binary ELFs and use BinDiff for similarity analysis. Quickly determining whether two apps are related is interesting for a couple of reasons: Malware detection, impersonification, lineage analysis, and more. But making this decision based on their code has many pitfalls, even if we don't take obfuscation into account. Stale tools, no updates, missing dependencies - instead of those we'll use the binary representation of apps and a combination of open source tools to get an estimator for code similarity. The talk will cover some Android internals based on examples, and will provide a practical blueprint how to calculate code-based similarity of apps based on open-source tools. Suitable for non-reverse-engineers. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/J9QR9K/back2thebinary_q4q2w91.jpg Jakob Bleier 2026-06-27T16:10:00+02:00 16:10 00:55 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-669-windows-ce-memory-archaeology-recovering-files-from-windows-ce-5-0-on-nxp-i-mx28-nand-flash https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/UDUZHL/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Medium Talk en This talk tells the story how a “let’s quickly look at the files” span to a multi-day journey into ancient Windows CE filesystems and NXP processor NAND flash handling in an embedded system. Expect a deeply technical talk that explains how handling single bits make a difference and lets you peek into the complexity below (embedded) operating systems. One of the first steps in embedded systems vulnerability research is to access the firmware, obtained from firmware updates or from a physical device. How hard can it be? Usually not that much. But in this case, after failing miserably using the quick and easy standard approach, we doubled down and layer by layer uncovered how files are stored by Windows CE 5.0 on devices using the NXP i.MX28 processor. The single topics are nothing new, but due to the age and targeting (mobile phones and PDAs) of most Windows CE tooling and hardware specifics, ready-to-use tools failed repeatedly. Starting with no clue about Windows CE internals, our approach was to leverage a combination of ancient technology (Windows XP) and modern technology (AI) to understand what we are dealing with and to adapt and build our customized tooling. Gerhard Hechenberger 2026-06-27T17:10:00+02:00 17:10 01:00 Mittlerer Saal (Track 1) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-686-zero-files-zero-noise-checkmate-in-three- https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/FHQ7JH/ false Mittlerer Saal (Track 1 - 260 pax) Talk en In this talk, we walk through a real intrusion observed in an EDR-monitored enterprise environment. The case did not start with a major incident or a flood of alerts. It began with two ambiguous notifications in the Defender portal that the customer could not immediately classify. What looked like a minor signal turned into a live hunt: an operator attempting fileless execution, interacting with endpoint controls, trying to disable or bypass defenses, and carefully pivoting through the network. Modern intrusions rarely fail because one alert says everything. They fail when small, imperfect traces are recognized early enough and correlated into a timeline the operator did not expect. In this case, OSINT and TTP comparison helped us put the observed behavior into context. We found overlaps with previously reported activity dating back to 2022, showing which parts of the operator’s tradecraft remained stable and which had been adapted to the current defensive environment. This makes the case relevant now: the tooling changed, but the operational habits, decision points, and forensic residue remained recognizable. The focus is not attribution for its own sake, but understanding how recognizable patterns can support an active investigation. We will show how the investigation moved through three decisive phases: identifying the initial execution pattern, separating real attacker activity from low-signal security telemetry, and reconstructing the operator’s movement from endpoint, identity, and network evidence. Along the way, we will discuss what the defender’s environment made possible, where visibility was missing, and why the attacker’s interaction with Defender became an investigative advantage rather than just a detection failure. The focus is Incident Response depth: not attribution, not tool training, but the reconstruction of attacker behavior from imperfect telemetry. Attendees will see how current fileless and defense-evasion techniques can still produce useful traces, which log sources made the difference in this case, and how two initially unclear Defender for Endpoint notifications were turned into a defensible incident timeline. Jonas Plitt 2026-06-27T10:05:00+02:00 10:05 00:30 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-635-it-s-not-you-it-s-your-dependencies-a-nerdy-lawyer-s-guide-to-the-software-supply-chain https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/AJN9TG/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Short Talk en This talk is about SBOM — the thing that has become the most important compliance artifact in software development. I'll cover: * **Why?** A brief, painful tour through the legal plot twists that turned the SBOM from a nice-to-have into a "you literally cannot sell this product without one" because too many discovered they had no idea what they were actually running. * **What?** what actually goes in one, what people *think* goes in one, why legal and IT security want one, and what happens if you vibe-coded the whole thing. * **Who?** What this all means for software developers, open source maintainers who never signed up to be vendors, and where the liability actually lies. Expect war stories, regulatory translation services, a healthy amount of "I am not your lawyer, but…", less “it depends” and a takeaway list of things you can actually do on Monday morning — whether you're shipping software, consuming it, or maintaining the one library that all of your products depend on. Katharina Bisset 2026-06-27T10:40:00+02:00 10:40 01:00 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-664-locks-opened-keyless-the-hard-way https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/Z7XYAA/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Talk en Possibly you already know lock picking. Possibly not. We explain what happens in the lock while picking or regularly with a key. Lock picking itself, we will show you in an own workshop at the bsides vienna. Additional, there are competitions. For example the yearly austrian championship. Or the belt-system, which be presented. A lock can be a hard challenge to open without a key. Regularly these are installed in a door. We do it a little bit easier, we do not install them, we hold them in our own hand. But additionally we do it a little bit harder, because we do not want to destroy them. If you want to open the door, there are much easier ways, but they will damage something. You do not need to know, how a lock works, to pick them. Usually, we do not explain it, we let beginners open the lock for the first time and anybody is surprised, it works easy. But it was an easy lock. But what are the differences between an easy and a hard lock? So for that we have to explain a lock and the key. Which technical behaviors are used to make it more and more challenging. Somebody could think, the manufactures do it for more fun for the lock pickers. For more fun, it is nice to use rules for competitions. The belt-system is one. Anybody can participate. And you can use it to describe the fun - sorry - the easiness or hardness of a lock for lock pickers. deacTiborElias 2026-06-27T11:45:00+02:00 11:45 00:20 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-647-your-firewall-won-t-save-you-from-a-crowbar-introducing-the-pact-framework https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/3GKCFS/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Short Talk en For years, the cybersecurity community has worshiped at the altar of the MITRE ATT&CK® framework to track digital adversary behaviors. We spend millions hardening the cloud, fine-tuning EDRs, and chasing zero-days, yet we consistently forget one glaring reality: an adversary can just walk through the front door with a high-vis vest and a clipboard. Enter PACT (Physical Access & Control Taxonomy). Built to bridge the grand canyon between meatspace and cyberspace, PACT is an open-source, community-driven framework that translates physical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) into a structured matrix that mirrors the MITRE ATT&CK format. We spend millions hardening the cloud, fine-tuning EDRs, and chasing zero-days, yet we consistently forget one glaring reality: an adversary can just walk through the front door with a high-vis vest and a clipboard. For years, the cybersecurity community has worshiped at the altar of the MITRE ATT&CK® framework to track digital adversary behaviors. Meanwhile, physical security has remained trapped in a legacy bubble of "locks, blocks, and glocks," utilizing entirely different risk languages. When a threat actor breaks into a facility to deploy a network implant, is it a cyber attack or a physical breach? It's both-and our current defense matrices fail to map this convergence. Enter PACT (Physical Access & Control Taxonomy). Built to bridge the grand canyon between meatspace and cyberspace, PACT is an open-source, community-driven framework that translates physical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) into a structured matrix that mirrors the MITRE ATT&CK format. This talk will rip off the band-aid of siloed security, break down the anatomy of the PACT matrix, and demonstrate how Red and Blue teams can finally use a single, unified language to hunt threats across both the digital and physical realms. Darius Beckert 2026-06-27T13:05:00+02:00 13:05 00:50 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-634--the-human-factor-cybersecurity-s-weakest-link-or-most-adaptive-defense- https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/MAKHRG/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Medium Talk en In Cybersecurity there is a narrative existing: The problem is sitting in front of the screen… but is it? Our understanding of humans in cybersecurity is shaped by problematic metaphors, which influence how we design security systems. The way we likely describe humans, shapes how we approach cybersecurity. Humans are as seen as the weakest link: Humans are viewed as the main source of failure > Assumption: Technology is strong, humans are weak Humans are seen as driven by fear: as frightened animal > Assumption: Fear and punishment drive secure behavior And once you believe, that the human is the problem, you stop looking for better explanations. In our talk we will have a deeper look at these assumptions and the psychological as well as technical factors of (in)secure behavior in organizations Cognitive biases often cause individuals to underestimate rare but catastrophic risks or to place excessive trust in automation. Routine blindness may result in subtle anomalies being ignored when tasks become repetitive. Furthermore, poor collaboration and information silos weaken collective intelligence, while misguided prioritization—such as choosing convenience over security—can undermine defense efforts. Yet, to fully leverage the strengths like pattern recognition, intuition, adaptive reasoning and ethical decision making, organizations should minimize human error through training, supportive tools, and sustainable working conditions, ensuring that human intelligence can function as a powerful ally in defending against digital threats. In our talk we scrutinize the critical role of human behavior in cyber defense and how it reframes defense strategies beyond purely technical or machine-driven approaches. Human cognition acts as complementary system, not just a weak link. This creates a hybrid model, where adaptive human-decision making works in tandem with machine efficiency. One of its core strengths lies in pattern recognition and contextual understanding. Security analysts are often able to spot unusual behaviors or subtle anomalies that automated systems might overlook. Equally important are creativity and intuition, which allow humans to anticipate novel attack methods and think beyond established rules or signatures. Like the immune system, humans are capable of adaptability, adjusting strategies quickly in response to emerging threats. In addition, they bring ethical judgment and strategic decision-making, enabling a nuanced evaluation of risks that goes beyond metrics and algorithms. However, the human factor also introduces vulnerabilities. Alert fatigue and cognitive overload can reduce vigilance, leading to missed threats. Agenda: Assumptions „The problem is sitting in front of the screen“ (User) Security Behavior in Organizations – Security Compliance vs. Security Participation People don’t fail randomly. They fail predictably within the system we design. Organizational, Individual & Environmental influencing factors & dimensions of security behavior and the question “Why does security often not work in practice” „Policies are made to pass audits – not actually for you to follow“ Practical examples: force of habits, alert fatigue, psychological Acceptability: Phishing “Computers are weird” Key Takeaways Yvonne BauerWolfgang Ettlinger 2026-06-27T14:00:00+02:00 14:00 00:45 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-633-the-sky-is-no-longer-the-limit https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/USUBHG/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Medium Talk en How drones (UAV’s) are the threat everyone saw coming but no one acted in time. Drones are the "Gray Rhino" of modern security: a visible, high-probability threat we failed to mitigate. This talk explores how rapid UAV proliferation outpaced regulation, creating critical vulnerabilities in privacy and infrastructure. We’ll analyze the shift from hobbyist novelty to sophisticated aerial risk and the urgent need for counter-UAS strategies. While drones offer immense potential, they have introduced a complex new landscape of risk. This talk examines the "Gray Rhino" threats of 2026 high-probability security challenges often ignored until impact. We will analyze the transition of advanced drone tech from warzones to criminal enterprises, including the rise of unjammable fiber-optic controls and AI-enabled targeting. Beyond physical safety, we’ll explore the escalating vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and the too slow shifting regulatory response to aerial sabotage. We will dive deeper in the actual risk and legal mitigations we could and should take. The are shaping the battlefield already so society will be next. Stephan Van Dyck 2026-06-27T15:30:00+02:00 15:30 00:30 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-677-defending-identity-infrastructure-of-the-active-directory-with-deception-technologies https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/VDQMNY/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Short Talk en Active Directory remains the core identity system in most enterprise and governmental environments, making it a primary target for attackers after initial network compromise. Once inside a network, adversaries typically focus on AD reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement in order to gain full domain control. This presentation explores how attackers perform Active Directory enumeration using common tools and techniques, and why traditional security monitoring often fails to detect these early-stage activities. It then introduces deception-based defense strategies as an effective approach for early detection of malicious behavior within identity infrastructures. The session focuses on the use of Active Directory honeypots and canary tokens as proactive detection mechanisms. These decoy assets are designed to appear legitimate within the environment while acting as high-fidelity tripwires for suspicious activity. Any interaction with these objects can immediately signal potential reconnaissance or compromise attempts. Through practical examples and a simulated attack scenario, the talk demonstrates how deception techniques can detect attacker behavior during directory enumeration, credential discovery, and privilege mapping. The presentation also highlights how these mechanisms integrate into Purple Team methodologies and support incident response and forensic investigations. Attendees will gain insight into how deception technologies enhance visibility within Active Directory environments, reduce attacker dwell time, and enable earlier detection of identity-based attacks before they escalate into full domain compromise. Modern enterprise and governmental IT infrastructures rely heavily on identity systems to control access to critical resources. Among these systems, Active Directory (AD) remains the dominant identity management platform and therefore represents one of the most attractive targets for cyber attackers. Once an adversary gains an initial foothold inside a network—whether through phishing, credential compromise, or exploitation of a vulnerable system—the next strategic objective is typically the compromise of the identity infrastructure. By targeting Active Directory, attackers can escalate privileges, move laterally across systems, establish persistence, and ultimately achieve full domain dominance. In recent years, numerous large-scale breaches have demonstrated that attackers often operate inside networks for extended periods before detection. During this dwell time, adversaries perform extensive reconnaissance activities within the directory environment. These reconnaissance steps typically involve directory enumeration, credential harvesting, privilege path analysis, and the identification of high-value targets such as administrative accounts or privileged service identities. Tools such as BloodHound are commonly used by attackers to map relationships between users, groups, and systems, enabling them to identify potential privilege escalation paths. Traditional detection approaches frequently struggle to identify these early-stage reconnaissance activities. Security monitoring systems generate vast volumes of log data, making it difficult to distinguish malicious behavior from legitimate administrative activity. As a result, attackers are often detected only after significant damage has already occurred, such as during lateral movement, privilege escalation, or the deployment of ransomware. This presentation explores a proactive defensive strategy based on deception technologies, specifically focusing on the use of Active Directory honeypots and canary tokens as early-warning mechanisms within enterprise identity infrastructures. Deception techniques allow defenders to strategically place decoy assets within the directory environment that appear legitimate to attackers but are monitored closely by security teams. These assets function as highly sensitive tripwires: any interaction with them can immediately indicate suspicious or malicious activity. The talk will examine how deception-based controls can be integrated directly into Active Directory environments through multiple layers of defensive instrumentation. These layers may include honey user accounts, decoy service identities, embedded credential lures, deceptive group memberships, and carefully crafted scripts placed in shared directories such as SYSVOL. When adversaries enumerate the directory or attempt to leverage these artifacts during their reconnaissance phase, detection mechanisms can trigger alerts and provide defenders with early indicators of compromise. Particular attention will be given to the implementation of canary tokens, a form of digital tripwire that generates alerts when accessed or used. By embedding tokens within configuration files, service account descriptions, administrative scripts, or backup documentation, defenders can create realistic artifacts that attackers are likely to interact with during credential discovery or environment mapping. When these tokens are triggered, alerts can be delivered through email notifications, security monitoring platforms, or integrated SIEM systems, providing immediate visibility into suspicious activity. The presentation will also demonstrate how deception mechanisms can be incorporated into Purple Teaming methodologies, enabling collaboration between offensive and defensive security teams. Through controlled attack simulations performed by Red Teams, organizations can test whether their defensive monitoring systems successfully detect interactions with deception artifacts. Blue Teams can then refine detection rules, improve security monitoring workflows, and strengthen incident response procedures based on these insights. Beyond detection, deception technologies offer substantial benefits for digital forensic investigations. When attackers interact with honeypot objects or canary tokens, investigators can collect valuable forensic artifacts, including authentication attempts, directory queries, network activity, and timestamps associated with attacker behavior. These artifacts allow security teams to reconstruct the attacker’s timeline, understand the reconnaissance techniques used, and determine the scope of a potential compromise. In this way, deception systems act not only as detection mechanisms but also as forensic sensors that capture high-fidelity evidence of adversary activity. A practical implementation scenario will be presented in which an attacker performs Active Directory reconnaissance using common tools such as BloodHound. During the enumeration process, the attacker encounters a realistic honey account that appears to belong to a backup service. Embedded credential lures and a hidden token trigger lead the attacker to interact with a decoy artifact. As soon as the attacker attempts to use the discovered credentials or access the embedded token, an alert is generated through a monitoring system such as Microsoft Defender for Identity or a SIEM platform. This early detection enables defenders to begin incident response activities before the attacker can escalate privileges or achieve domain control. In addition to demonstrating the technical implementation of deception techniques, the presentation will discuss operational considerations and potential challenges. Effective deception requires realistic design to avoid detection by skilled adversaries. Honey accounts must follow believable naming conventions, deceptive artifacts must appear consistent with normal operational practices, and monitoring infrastructure must be properly configured to ensure reliable alerting. Maintenance and lifecycle management of deception assets are also important to maintain credibility within the environment. The session concludes by exploring the broader strategic implications of deception technologies in modern cyber defense architectures. As attackers increasingly target identity systems, defensive strategies must evolve to detect adversaries earlier in the attack lifecycle. Deception-based detection mechanisms provide a powerful complementary layer to traditional monitoring controls by focusing on attacker behavior rather than relying solely on anomaly detection within large datasets. By integrating honeypots, canary tokens, Purple Teaming exercises, and digital forensic analysis, organizations can significantly improve their ability to detect intrusions at an early stage, reduce attacker dwell time, and collect valuable intelligence about adversary techniques. The insights gained from these systems can help security teams strengthen defensive capabilities, refine detection strategies, and ultimately improve the resilience of enterprise identity infrastructures against modern cyber threats. Ahmed Hassan 2026-06-27T16:05:00+02:00 16:05 00:45 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-663-quantum-secure-communication https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/MZYRYC/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Short Talk en Open Source Quantum Secure VPN - QKD + PQC over WireGuard Quantum computers will break the encryption we rely on today, and the clock is ticking. But what does that actually mean, and what can you do about it right now? This talk starts from the ground up, giving attendees an accessible introduction to the two quantum-safe building blocks: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), a mathematical software-based replacement for classical key exchange, and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), a physics-based approach that uses quantum optical channels to distribute keys with information-theoretic security. No prior knowledge of quantum mechanics required. The second half of the talk is around ARNIKA (https://github.com/arnika-project/arnika) and how to build a fully open-source quantum secure VPN that wraps WireGuard with both PQC (Rosenpass) and QKD (via the ETSI014 API) into a single deployable solution. Attendees will leave with: QKD and PQC fundamentals, what they are, how they differ, and when to use each A technical dive into open-source quantum secure VPN architecture, key derivation, ETSI014 integration, and WireGuard PSK injection Target audience: Security professionals and engineers curious about quantum-safe networking, no quantum physics or crypto background needed. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/MZYRYC/quantum_encryption-not_IknJhEO.png Andreas Neuhold 2026-06-27T16:55:00+02:00 16:55 00:30 Dachsaal (Track 2 ) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-648-attackbed-a-damn-vulnerable-network-for-profit-and-fun https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/H7CXVP/ false Dachsaal (Track 2 - 190 pax) Talk en In the last few years, I was responsible, together with my colleagues, for the fully open-source framework "Attackbed". We developed simulated networks with automated attacks and collected data for further evaluation of security measures or for building machine learning datasets. One example of such an evaluation is testing the performance of LLMs when used to detect malicious behavior in logfiles. We not only created a simulation with complex attack chains but also developed several public Metasploit Exploits and an automated attack tool. I will cover all the technologies and attack chains, and provide a perspective on potential use cases for this open-source framework. Wolfgang Hotwagner 2026-06-27T09:45:00+02:00 09:45 00:30 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-685-when-machines-hack-back-how-ai-rewrote-the-threat-landscape-in-12-months https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/AXV9VA/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Short Talk en AI has industrialized cybercrime. Exploit timelines collapsed from days to hours, ransomware victims surged 389%, and 4.6 billion stolen credentials flooded darknet markets. Then Claude Mythos showed autonomous zero-day discovery at scale. This talk presents current threat data, examines how AI reshapes both offense and defense, and offers practical strategies for security leaders. In 2025, cybercrime became a continuous, machine-speed system. Exploitation attempts surged 25% to 120 billion globally, time-to-exploit dropped to 24–48 hours, and AI tools like WormGPT eliminated the skill barrier for attackers. Identity replaced malware as the primary attack vector, with billions of stolen credentials enabling login-based intrusions at scale. Deepfakes now target executives directly for fraud and access. The Claude Mythos announcement in April 2026 marked an inflection point: autonomous discovery of decade-old zero-days across all major operating systems overnight, for under $2,000 per exploit. This talk covers current threat data, the implications for defenders, and why Continuous Threat Exposure Management and AI-enabled defense are no longer optional. Ronke Babajide 2026-06-27T11:00:00+02:00 11:00 00:45 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-645-hacking-mobile-apps-in-a-structured-way https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/A7AUTY/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Medium Talk en Mobile app testing has many pitfalls and a structured approach is needed to get a holistic picture of the attack surface. The OWASP Mobile Application Security (MAS) project is able to support you with that. In this talk, you'll get a practical introduction to the MAS ecosystem which consists of the standard, mobile weaknesses and how to test them. You will see test cases and demos for iOS and Android in action for static and dynamic analysis, and learn how to perform a mobile penetration test on a non-jailbroken iOS device. Sven Schleier 2026-06-27T13:00:00+02:00 13:00 00:30 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-650-hackerone-club-austria https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/8ACFFK/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Short Talk en HackerOne Club Austria! This club is dedicated to building a collaborative and welcoming hacker community across Austria. Whether you are an experienced bug bounty hunter, cybersecurity professional, student, or someone just getting started in ethical hacking, you are welcome to join and grow with the community. The Austria HackerOne Club organizes a wide range of events including: - local meetups - live hacking sessions - educational workshops - Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions - conference gatherings - world cup meetings (AWC) - discussions focused on bug bounty, ethical hacking, and cybersecurity. HackerOne Club Austria! This club is dedicated to building a collaborative and welcoming hacker community across Austria. Whether you are an experienced bug bounty hunter, cybersecurity professional, student, or someone just getting started in ethical hacking, you are welcome to join and grow with the community. The Austria HackerOne Club organizes a wide range of events including: - local meetups - live hacking sessions - educational workshops - Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions - conference gatherings - world cup meetings (AWC) - discussions focused on bug bounty, ethical hacking, and cybersecurity. These events are designed to encourage hands-on learning, knowledge sharing, collaboration, and stronger connections within the local security community. Hacking Meeting: The hacking meetings are especially interesting to community members. Hackers come together in person or virtually to hack on bug bounty programs. HackerOne may partner with private programs to provide an interesting meetup. Members may get access to new and fresh hacking scope or invitations to private programs. HackerOne provides a leaderboard to track the progress of the meetup. There is the possibility of special reward multipliers or better payouts for researchers. By joining this club, you'll stay informed about upcoming HackerOne community events in Austria, connect with fellow hackers in your region, and become part of a global community that values learning, responsible disclosure, and collaboration. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/8ACFFK/Auteria-banner_kKekdy7.png Alexander Krenn 2026-06-27T13:35:00+02:00 13:35 00:45 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-636-offensive-ai-red-teaming-machine-learning-systems https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/VA3RKU/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Medium Talk en This talk explores offensive security techniques against ML and LLM systems, from adversarial inputs and data poisoning to prompt injection and model extraction, with a live local demonstration of indirect prompt injection against a self-hosted model. The attendees will learn about the risks of deploying AI systems without proper security measures. This talk introduces the Offensive AI Framework, an open, structured knowledge base mapped to OWASP ML Top 10, OWASP LLM Top 10, and Google's SAIF. There will be a public repository where all the information related to the frameworks will be matched between the frameworks. Attendees will learn how ML models are trained and where that process introduces risk, how the major AI vulnerability frameworks are organized, and see practical exploitation of real vulnerabilities including data poisoning, prompt injection, and model fingerprinting. The session closes with a fully local live demo, no internet required, showing how reconnaissance leads to successful exploitation through indirect prompt injection (I will have a recorded video of the exploitation just in case as well). [Offensive-AI Framework](https://github.com/hardsoftsecurity/Offensive-AI) /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/VA3RKU/offensive-ai_ftNLjx8.png David De Maya Merras 2026-06-27T15:05:00+02:00 15:05 01:00 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-667-xpc-client-validation-music-to-my-ears- https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/XX8GYX/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Medium Talk en This talk examines how established macOS exploitation techniques can be applied to a largely overlooked attack surface: audio plugin installers. By analyzing installers from multiple major vendors, I demonstrate how common design and implementation flaws can be leveraged to achieve local privilege escalation. The presentation covers nine CVEs across five different vendors, highlighting recurring vulnerability patterns, exploitation strategies, and the security implications for both developers and end users. Attendees will gain insight into the intersection of macOS installer security and the audio software ecosystem, along with practical lessons for identifying and mitigating similar issues. Florian Haselsteiner 2026-06-27T16:10:00+02:00 16:10 01:00 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-680-what-is-software- https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/78ZAJJ/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Talk en The answer to this question seems quite straightforward until we really start to think about it. My talk is inspired by a concept of Fred Brooks' 1986 paper "No Silver Bullet": the difference between essential and accidental complexity of software, only the first of which is an inherent and unremovable part of it. I want to investigate if such an "essence" of software really exists, and what follows if we take this view seriously. Mária Kamilla Huszár 2026-06-27T17:15:00+02:00 17:15 00:30 Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - Women4Cyber/Rookie) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-679-parsing-cbor-is-a-minefield-a-study-of-cbor-parser-behavior https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/V7JZEW/ false Kreativraum 3.1 (Track 3 - 50 pax - Women4Cyber/Rookie) Short Talk en CBOR (RFC 8949) is a binary serialization format used in constrained security-critical systems like FIDO2/WebAuthn and COSE. Despite a precise specification, implementations diverge across languages and systems, leading to different behavior when confronted with the same input. In this talk, 11 CBOR parsers across seven languages are compared to identify security-relevant behavior, such as unexpected acceptance/rejection of input, hangs and crashes. CBOR underpins much of modern security infrastructure. Yet whether two implementations agree on what a given byte sequence means, and how they handle edge cases and malformed data, has received little public systematic attention. This talk examines 11 widely-used CBOR parsers spanning C, Rust, Python, Java, Go, C#, and JavaScript, selected for real-world deployment, active maintenance, and architectural diversity. I cover the testing methodology, including fuzzing and a differential-testing harness that runs shared valid and invalid inputs across all parsers, as well as how the resulting divergences are visualized and analyzed. Finally, I discuss the observed divergences and any crashes the testing uncovered, their underlying reasons, and the security implications. As this talk presents ongoing research as part of my master's thesis, the results are still preliminary and open to change. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/V7JZEW/cbor_minesweeper_cover_lKZgHg1.png Jakob Pachmann 2026-06-27T09:30:00+02:00 09:30 02:00 Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-638-ntlm-relaying-in-practice https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/FP9L8D/ false Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track - 20 pax) Workshop en In a lab environment we are going to do some hands-on sessions about NTLM-Relaying and showing common protection mechanisms that are effective against these kinds of attacks. So the workshop should be interesting for sysadmins and pentesters alike. It ties into our talk about modern NTLM-Relaying methods and lets participants try out the attacks in a simulated environment provided by us. In a Windows Active Directory environment, minor misconfigurations can lead to total domain compromise. This hands-on workshop dives into NTLM-Relaying attacks and explores exactly what happens when critical defenses like SMB signing and LDAP signing are left disabled and how NTLM-Relaying can still be abused with these mechanisms enabled. ​Through practical, real-world demonstrations, participants will learn: <ul> <li>How attackers intercept and abuse NTLM authentication</li> <li>Lateral movement and privilege escalation scenarios caused by missing mitigations</li> <li>Step-by-step blueprints to effectively secure your AD environment against these threats</li> </ul> ​By the end of this session, you will not only understand how attackers exploit NTLM-Relaying but also how to shut them down. To attend this workshop, participants will need a laptop with an installed SSH client. Benjamin FlorianiPatrick Pongratz 2026-06-27T12:30:00+02:00 12:30 01:59 Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-665-try-to-open-a-lock-keyless https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/8Q9BGK/ false Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track - 20 pax) Workshop en Really short: You can try to open a lock without a key for you first time. You do not need own tools for that, we provide everything you need, also the locks. If you have your own tools, you can use it. After the workshop, you would be ready for the Austrian championship next year. deacTiborElias 2026-06-27T15:15:00+02:00 15:15 00:45 Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track) bsidesvienna-0x7ea-682-before-there-was-a-password-the-philosophy-and-politics-of-secrecy https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/9JKBGC/ false Kleiner Saal (Workshops Track - 20 pax) Medium Talk en "Secrecy is not a technical problem with a technical solution — it is a social contract so old we've forgotten we signed it." Before encryption. Before firewalls. Before the first wax seal was pressed into a letter — someone decided that some things should not be known by everyone. Why? This workshop doesn't start with algorithms. It starts much earlier: with the question of why humans began keeping secrets at all, what social and cognitive machinery that required, and what it might mean to dismantle those categories entirely. /media/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/submissions/9JKBGC/3-1_3BGf0PD.jpg Iryna