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UID:pretalx-bsidesvienna-0x7ea-W9MWHG@cfp.bsidesvienna.at
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260627T140500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20260627T145000
DESCRIPTION:Four years ago\, Project TEMPA exposed the fundamental vulnerab
 ilities within Tesla’s Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Passive Entry system a
 nd the Vehicle Controller Secondary (VCSEC) protocol. The research demonst
 rated how trivial it was to execute Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) relay attacks
  to unlock and drive away modern vehicles. In response\, Tesla embarked on
  a multi-year effort to overhaul its access systems. But did they actually
  fix the underlying problems\, or just change the locks?\n​In this prese
 ntation\, we are getting "phonkey" again. We will dive into a comprehensiv
 e 4-year retrospective of Tesla’s Phonekey security evolution\, dissecti
 ng the ongoing tug-of-war between seamless user experience and robust vehi
 cle security.
DTSTAMP:20260702T214550Z
LOCATION:Mittlerer Saal (Track 1)
SUMMARY:Project TEMPA: Getting Phon(e)key with Tesla Security Again - Marti
 n Herfurt
URL:https://cfp.bsidesvienna.at/bsidesvienna-0x7ea/talk/W9MWHG/
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