




# The Human Factor

Cybersecurity's weakest link or most adaptive defense?


Public

**CERTITUDE**

„The problem is sitting in front of the screen“



# Assumptions [Soliman & Järveläinen]




Fear and punishment drive secure behavior

**“...and once you believe, that the human is the problem, you stop looking for better explanations.”**

Technology is strong, humans are weak

# Security Behavior in Organizations



People don't fail randomly.  
They fail predictably within  
the system we design.


- > **Security Climate/Culture**
- > Security Trainings
- > Security Policies
- > Social Systems
- > Usability
- > (Dis-)Incentives
- > ...

# Organization

„Follow policies!“



Infosec



„... but dont tell Infosec!“



„Prioritize profitability!“



# Environment



Job Pressure




Security Event



Workgroup

# Five Factor Model (FFM) – BIG 5



Other relevant personality traits

- > Locus of control
- > Propensity for risk-taking
- > Job attitudes
- > Safety attitudes

# Individual Human Behavior

~~If people know better, they  
will act better~~



Avoidance/Denial




Secure Behavior



Ignoring Threats

„The problem is sitting in front of the screen“



# Recommendations

## Design organizations for collaboration / align the organization

- bridging = break silos
- shared responsibility: community over control
- security = team sport
- foster collaboration
- empower security teams
- reward good behavior
- ...

## Design for individuals

- balancing awareness + confidence
- motivation > fear
- enable action
- support decision-making
- Frame the human as an asset -> „security hero“: sensors, adaptive defenders
- ...

## Design environments for secure behavior


- adopt security by design
- reduce cognitive and workload pressure
- focus on motivation, not just training
- ...

# Systems Designed for Humans to Fail

Why does security not work in practice



„Policies are made to pass audits –  
not actually for you to follow“

- 
1. Passwords must be 14 characters long, contain uppercase, lowercase, special and number characters
  2. Don't re-use passwords
  3. Don't re-use private passwords for company accounts
  4. Passwords need to be changed at a minimum every 30 days

```
COMPANY: NEXT CHANGE: 2026-06-01
PRE-BOOT AUTHENTICATION: *****
AD: *****
PASSWORD MANAGER: *****
PHONE UNLOCK PW: *****
VISA PIN: ****
SIM PIN: *****

PRIVATE:
PASSWORD MANAGER: *****
WINDOWS LOGIN: *****
PHONE UNLOCK PIN: *****
GARAGE DOOR PIN: *****
VISA PIN: ****
AMEX PIN: ****
```

# Passwords

1. We know passwords are insecure
2. Majority of authentication is based on passwords
3. ???
4. Why are so many accounts breached?

# Force of Habit



When a user is inactive for over 10 minutes, they must be forced to re-authenticate.

A diagram of a login form with a light yellow background and a dark green border. It contains three input fields: a username field with 'john\_doe', a password field with 'Password', and a 'Login' button.

john\_doe

Password

Login

# Alert Fatigue




Source: Cstutz  
(CC BY-SA 4.0)  
Wikimedia Commons

# Principal of Psychological Acceptability [Saltzer & Schroeder]



# Psychological Acceptability: Phishing



1. Check Sender
2. Check Hyperlinks
3. Check URL

```
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/...  
https://microsoft.com@example.com/login.php
```

Spot the phishing domain:

```
microsoftonline.com  
office.com  
cloud.microsoft  
microsoft.com  
teams.com  
microsoft-online.com  
sharepoint.com  
outlook.com
```

User Account Control



Do you want to allow this app to make changes to your device?



Windows PowerShell

Verified publisher: Microsoft Windows

[Show more details](#)

To continue, enter an admin username and password.

Administrator

Password

WINDOWSDEV\Administrator

Yes

No

# Secure Layer 8 Design

- > Who are your users?
- > What can you **really** expect from your users?
- > Why did users fail?

# Human Intrusion Detectors

  
Computers  
are  
Weird!

# Key Takeaways

1. Humans are more **complex** than fear-driven actors
2. Security is a **complex socio-technical system**
3. Humans are not just users
4. Cybersecurity fails, because we **frame humans incorrectly**
5. Cybersecurity is not solved by fear or trainings alone
6. Cybersecurity success depends on alignment between the security team and the organization
7. Cybersecurity not as a compliance issue but a **system design problem**: Well-designed systems enable better human decisions

**Better metaphors →  
better systems →  
better security**

# Q & A

Web <https://certitude.consulting/>

LinkedIn [certitude-consulting](https://www.linkedin.com/company/certitude-consulting)

## Sources

[Saltzer & Schroeder]

The Protection of Information in Computer Systems (JEROME H. SALTZER, MICHAEL D. SCHROEDER)

<https://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/>

The Line of Death

<https://textslashplain.com/2017/01/14/the-line-of-death/>

[Soliman & Järveläinen]

Reconceptualizing the Human in the Loop: A Problematization of Taken-for-Granted Metaphors in Cybersecurity Research

[Galletta et al.]

Balancing Fear and Confidence: A Strategic Approach to Mitigating Human Risk in Cybersecurity.

[Durcikova et al.]

United we stand, divided we fall: an autogenic perspective on empowering cybersecurity in organizations.

[Dennis]

Employees are not the weakest link: an occupational safety view of information security.

If most of your users are “too dumb”  
it's a YOU-problem.

**The human is not the weakest link. A  
badly designed system – and a  
disconnected organization is!**

